In the end, it was still the familiar taste, and even the familiar score—3 to 3! After an ideal start, the German team, which was experimenting with three central defenders, was foolishly and clumsily conceded 3 goals by the opponent. In the end, it only relied on Haverts, who came off the bench, to score 1 goal to avoid losing in the 1,000th game in team history.
The uncommon big score of 3 to 3 has become the epitome of this German team in the trough in recent years.
]]>
"Stupid defense"
The uncommon big score of 3 to 3 has become the epitome of this German team in the trough in recent years.
Last year, in the final game of the Europa League group stage as a guest in London, the German team led 2-0 and conceded 3 goals in a row within 72 to 83 minutes. Fortunately, Haverts finally caught the low-level error of England goalkeeper Pope Evened 3 to 3.
In the international competition week in October 2020, Loew's German team played two 3-3 scores against Turkey (friendly match) and Switzerland (European League) in just one week.
In that UEFA Europa League, Ukraine and Spain were also in the same group as the German team. At that time, the German team completed a double play against Ukraine and led the standings with one round left. As a result, they lost 6 goals in Seville, forcing Loew to submit his resignation.
After a lapse of two and a half years, the Ukrainian team was played again. The game was given too much meaning beyond competition. This was not only the 1,000th game in the history of the German team. One of the reasons for the German team's disastrous defeat in the World Cup in Qatar, but obviously the Germans will not give up the opportunity to use football to express their position, which is an important part of their football culture. The result is the same as the World Cup opener against Japan. Once they don't put all their minds on football, football will punish them.
The Ukrainian team seemed passive, but almost every counterattack could be converted into a goal. Before the end of the first half, goalkeeper Trubin helped Dortmund old player Yarmolenko break into the right side of the penalty area with a long pass. Facing the close defense of Schlotbeck, the Ukrainian captain confidently dribbled the ball back and skillfully passed it back with his heel. Right back Temchik, who inserted in time, pushed Raum into the small penalty area and hit the right side of the penalty area. sidelines. Although the goal was not scored, the physical and technical advantages of Yarmolenko and Temchik in one-on-one are shocking. But as long as you are not forgetful, you must still remember the scene in the battle against Japan, when Schloterbeck was forced to blast by Asano Takuma with speed and body at the end of the game and then scored from a small angle. It's also incredible.
Yes, Ginter, Schlotterbeck or Raum are of course far inferior to Jerome Boateng, Hummels or Lahm at their peak, but these German players who are in their prime Will the defender really be so bad that he can be played by these not top Ukrainian and Japanese players? At least in club games, similar scenes are not common, but it has become commonplace in the German team, which is puzzling. Even Rudiger, the only one who can do it, has never given people enough security in the national team-whether it is playing four backs or a three-back system that is more suitable for him.
After a lapse of two and a half years, the Ukrainian team was played again. The game was given too much meaning beyond competition. This was not only the 1,000th game in the history of the German team. One of the reasons for the German team's disastrous defeat in the World Cup in Qatar, but obviously the Germans will not give up the opportunity to use football to express their position, which is an important part of their football culture. The result is the same as the World Cup opener against Japan. Once they don't put all their minds on football, football will punish them.
This 3-3 score was exactly the same as the second half against England. Flick said: "We started well, took the lead, and the fans were in good spirits. Then we made a personal mistake and conceded the goal." First, Brandt made a mistake in the frontcourt return, which gave Ukraine a long pass to counterattack and equalize. , and then Raum was intercepted by Yarmolenko when he exchanged a pass with Nico Schlotbeck on the left side of the midfield, which eventually led to Rudiger refracting Mudrek's push that was clearly off target into the net. The two conceded goals were only 5 minutes apart. Deja vu? Against Belgium in March, the German team conceded 2 goals in a row within 6 to 9 minutes, and the defense also collapsed all at once.
Kimmich said after the game: "I think we started well and felt pretty good. We took the lead and had one or two other good chances. Then we conceded two stupid goals. One from the long Pass, and the other is a mistake when the attack was launched." In a short period of time, from a 1-0 lead to a 1-2 lag, the German team's offensive strength in the first 15 minutes came to an abrupt end. The situation of encircling the opponent's penalty area and continuing to pass, but it is difficult to form a threatening shot, is similar to the World War I against Japan seven months ago.
Is it really a lack of player ability?
The Ukrainian team seemed passive, but almost every counterattack could be converted into a goal. Before the end of the first half, goalkeeper Trubin helped Dortmund old player Yarmolenko break into the right side of the penalty area with a long pass. Facing the close defense of Schlotbeck, the Ukrainian captain confidently dribbled the ball back and skillfully passed it back with his heel. Right back Temchik, who inserted in time, pushed Raum into the small penalty area and hit the right side of the penalty area. sidelines. Although the goal was not scored, the physical and technical advantages of Yarmolenko and Temchik in one-on-one are shocking. But as long as you are not forgetful, you must still remember the scene in the battle against Japan, when Schloterbeck was forced to blast by Asano Takuma with speed and body at the end of the game and then scored from a small angle. It's also incredible.
An even more outrageous scene happened at the beginning of the second half. Brandt unnecessarily passed back to the penalty area with a large foot from the wing, forcing Gentle to retreat slightly before barely stopping the ball with his right thigh. As a result, the tall Freiburg central defender Losing control slightly, he was immediately intercepted by Dovbeck, and finally allowed Zihankov to score twice easily.
Yes, Ginter, Schlotterbeck or Raum are of course far inferior to Jerome Boateng, Hummels or Lahm at their peak, but these German players who are in their prime Will the defender really be so bad that he can be played by these not top Ukrainian and Japanese players? At least in club games, similar scenes are not common, but it has become commonplace in the German team, which is puzzling. Even Rudiger, the only one who can do it, has never given people enough security in the national team-whether it is playing four backs or a three-back system that is more suitable for him.
Flick does not think that the current group of players is not capable enough. He has repeatedly emphasized that this German team is very strong, and this is definitely not a misjudgment. "I have coached many teams and held other positions, including being an assistant here. What I saw in training is very High level. But the team will lose confidence in their own strength relatively quickly. We need to practice more in this area, and it is best to accumulate bit by bit through victories. Therefore, the road we are going to take together will be It's a little more difficult than normal roads."
The three central defenders gave up halfway in the first try
In the 3 games after the World Cup, the German team has used 3 different formations. When defeating Peru 2-0, Flick switched to double forwards and sacrificed 4222, which was ideal. As a result, facing the much stronger Belgium, this formation completely lost the midfield, so Flick decisively changed to 433 in the middle of the first half. After more than two months of deliberation, Flick decided to play three central defenders in this international competition week.
In this game, in the first half, Rudiger, Gentle and Schlotterbeck formed a three-center back from right to left. Rudiger switched to the left after half-time, as Klostermann replaced Schlotterbeck. But shortly after the score became 1 to 3, Flick changed the four backs through substitutions, allowing Klostermann to be the right back.
Asked after the game whether this meant the trial of the three central defenders ended in failure, Flick gave a negative answer, "Focus on the overall situation, we have a plan, and we will continue to implement it. This is a matter of inertia and requires competition. We will work hard for it. For things that are not done well, we will clearly point out and train."
It is a normal development process to find problems and correct them in the experiment. But for the German team, which has conducted too many experiments in the past few years and found too many problems but has not been able to cure them, is there really time and capital to continue trial and error?
In fact, Loew had changed to three central defenders in the European Cup two years ago, but the results showed that adding a central defender, or even playing conservatively overall, could not fundamentally improve the German team's defensive quality. The premise for Flick to play three central defenders is obviously that he does not intend to give up his consistent pursuit of ball possession advantage and scene suppression, at least when facing opponents like Ukraine who are not as strong as himself. As a result, in the process of transitioning from offense to defense, the mutual coordination of players in the new system completely failed.
How to give players trust?
In addition to the three central defenders, Flick's other major adjustment in this game is to place Kimmich in the 8th position, and it is Goretzka, the real "No. 8", who is responsible for the delay in the midfield. But the facts prove once again that the magnetic card with strong forward desire is not suitable for this position.
His brightest moment of the game was precisely when he pressed up near the top of the arc in the penalty area. After receiving a cross from Schloterbeck, his right-footed shot will miss the right post.
Flick emphasized the need to give players trust, but 캡도메인 pointed out that his method of giving trust is questionable. Just like before the World Cup, the way he gave Timo Werner absolute trust was not to design a more suitable frontcourt position for him, but to nail him to the center position of 4231. This is very important for Werner and the team It's all just hurt. Now let Goretzka play the 6th position, the situation is similar.
Flick emphasized the need to give players trust, but 캡도메인 pointed out that his method of giving trust is questionable. Just like before the World Cup, the way he gave Timo Werner absolute trust was not to design a more suitable frontcourt position for him, but to nail him to the center position of 4231. This is very important for Werner and the team It's all just hurt. Now let Goretzka play the 6th position, the situation is similar.
In fact, in the previous game against Belgium, Kimmich and Goretzka started together, and Kimmich was still behind. It was not until Emre Can replaced Goretzka in the 32nd minute that Kimmich changed to play. No. 8.
When playing against Peru, Kimmich partnered with Emre Can in the starting double midfielder, and Can was also dragged behind. Recently, German football has come to a new consensus: Compared with the 6th position, Kimmich's characteristics are more suitable for a little forward, especially considering that his offensive role is obviously greater than that of serving as a defensive barrier. So both Bayern and the national team are considering equipping Kimmich with a No. 6 that is more defensive.
Emre Can performed well in the two games in March, which initially proved his value as a "Kimmich bodyguard", but he did not get a chance to play in this game. In the state of having to attack on the last half hour, Flick simply replaced Goretzka with Musiala, without a full-time defensive No. 6.
In the next game in Poland, Flick may rearrange Emre Can as a defensive barrier. But apart from Emre Can, Flick has no other No. 6 of the same type. For candidates like Andrish or Rani Khedira, he has been turning a blind eye, not even giving a chance to try.
When the so-called trust has not been rewarded, and when the positive changes expected by Flick and the outside world have not appeared for a long time, self-doubt within the German team will naturally continue to grow, and it will become increasingly difficult for players to transplant the excellent state and confidence in the club. In the national team, I even feel afraid of playing for the national team.
"Kicker" clearly pointed out in the post-match comments that Flick must quickly find a solution and produce results, preferably in the game against Poland on Friday and next Tuesday against Colombia. Otherwise, more and more people will lose confidence in Flick's prospects of turning things around in the European Cup. In fact, this passage has been said tactfully enough to give Flick face.
Flick also admitted that the optimism was fading, with the Euros on home soil just a year away, "but many of you also experienced the atmosphere in March 2006 after losing 4-1 away to Italy. extremely negative.
But in the end, it turned into a summer fairytale. We are a little further away from the big game, and we know there is still a lot of work to do. I believe in the team, but it's better to win games. "
